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Part Three: Economic and Cultural Issues
The Japanese Army and the Control of Southern Thai 
Railways, 1941?1945
Puengthip Kiattisahakul?Assistant Professor, Faculty of Arts, Silpakorn University
Introduction
Most of the studies on the Japanese control of railways in Thailand during World War II tend to fo-
cus only on the construction of the Thai?Burma Railway, making it seem as if this were the only rail-
way line that the Japanese Army sought to control and manage during the war. However, Thai oﬃcial 
sources clearly reveal that the Japanese Army actually controlled all of Thailand?s three main railway 
lines?the northern, eastern and southern. The southern railway line in particular was so important 
that the Japanese Army had to manage it in two ways: first, controlling an existing line to be used for 
the transportation of troops and supplies across border to Malaya, and second, constructing two new 
railway lines branching out to Burma, i.e. the Thai?Burma ?Death? Railway and the Chumpon?Kraburi 
line. Control and management also diﬀered between the northern and eastern lines.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine various aspects of the Japanese Army?s control over 
southern Thai railways during the war. The paper especially pays attention to the way by which the Jap-
anese exerted control over southern Thai railways, and the impact that this control had on the Japanese 
Army and the Thai Railway Department. This paper also includes a case study which strongly suggests 
that the wartime relationship between Thailand and Japan was not on equal basis, that the Japanese 
Army was ready to use military power to control the railway management and to put strong pressure 
on the Thai government to facilitate goods supply and military transportation all through the war. 
1. The Japanese Army and the Control of Southern Thai Railways
From available primary materials, we can conclude that the Japanese Army regarded the southern 
railways as most important in their overall policy of control over the Thai railway system. This is be-
cause the southern railways were directly linked with the frontline battlefields in both Burma and Ma-
laya. The Japanese policy for the southern railways consisted of two plans. The first was to operate spe-
cial trains on existing routes for the transportation of Japanese troops across the Thai?Malaya border 
from Padang Besar to Alor Star and from Sungei Golok to Kota Bharu.1 The second was to build two 
new railway tracks extending from the existing southern railways into Burma. These were the Nong 
 1 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut (Supreme Command Headquarters), 2.4.1/5 Khosanoe kandoen rot khabuan thahan Yipun ok nok khet-
dean Thai [Proposal on opening a railway for Japanese military trains to cross the Thai border], 20 April 2485 (1942).
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Pladuk?Kanchanaburi?Thanbyuzayat line (the so-called the Thai?Burma Railway or Death Railway), 
and the Chumphon?Kraburi line (known as the Kra Canal Railway).
1.1?The Management of Special Trains on Existing Southern Route
Japanese control over the Thai railways started right after the outbreak of the Pacific War. On De-
cember 11, 1941, the Japanese Army presented a draft of a Japan?Thailand Military Alliance. On De-
cember 21, Prime Minister, Field Marshal Phibunsongkram signed this document. After the agree-
ment was ratified, detailed negotiations began concerning the use of railways for military purposes. 
On February 21, 1942, the Japanese submitted a ?Draft Agreement on Military Transportation,?2 to set 
criteria and guidelines for military transportation on the three existing Thai railway routes. The Japa-
nese Army defined ?military transportation? in a broad sense to include the transportation of troops, 
soldiers, civil oﬃcers, businessmen, animals, and anything else described by the Japanese Commander 
as military property.3 
Table 1 shows the routes and the number of special trains to operate which was requested by the Jap-
anese for military purposes. It clearly shows that the Japanese Army attached the greatest importance 
to the procurement and arrangement of special trains on the southern railway lines to transport troops 
and military supplies.
Table 1.? The Routes and Numbers of Special Trains Requested for Military Operations by the Japanese Army 
during World War II4
Route Between Trains requested (Regular)
Carriages requested 
(Regular)
Trains requested 
(Urgent)
East Bangkok?Sawai Donkeaw 3 27 6
North Bangkok?Uttaradit 2 50 4
Uttaradit?Chaingmai 3 11 8
Ban Dara?Sawankhalok 1 50 3
South Bangkok?Ban Pong 4 50 6
Ban Pong?Hat Yai 3 27 6
Hat Yai?Songkhla 1 27 3
Hat Yai?Sungei Golok 1 27 2
Hat Yai?Padang Besar 4 27 9
Table 2 shows the actual operation of carriages for Japanese military use from January to December 
1943. The total number of carriages on the three railway lines was 165,605, out of which the southern 
railways carried 113,120 carriages or 68.31%, as compared to 23.82% and 7.87% for the eastern and 
northern lines respectively. In terms of the percentage, the southern railways represented the highest 
 2 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1/3 Khotoklong kiaokae kanchai ngoen khadoisan lae khakhonsong noi lamliang nai ratchakan 
kongthap Yipun duai rotfai khong Prathet Thai [Arrangement on payments for fares and transportation costs for Thai trains 
used by the Japanese Army] (21 February 2485 [1942]?24 September 2488 [1945]).
 3 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1/26 Banthuek chuaicham kiaokap kankhonsong nai ratchakan thahan Yipun kap rotfai Thai [Aide-
mémoire on transport for Japanese military usage and Thai railways] (15 October 2485 [1942]?22 December 2486 [1943]).
 4 Tabulated from information in ibid.
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in August 1943 when the Japanese Army carried 12,379 carriages out of the total 15,677 carriages, ac-
counting for 78.96%. As the Japanese military had expected, the southern railways turned out to be the 
most important rail link, as the logistics line directly connected with the battlefield in Malaya.
Table 2.? Carriages Used by the Japanese Army on the Southern, Eastern and Northern Railway Lines (Jan?Dec 
1943)5
Month Carriages used
Southern Eastern Northern
Carriages % Carriages % Carriages %
Jan 11,518 7,608 66.05 3,898 33.84 12 0.10
Feb 10,354 8,648 69.84 3,722 30.06 12 0.10
Mar 13,070 9,107 69.68 3,252 24.88 711 5.44
Apr 12,690 9,740 76.75 2,750 21.67 200 1.58
May 13,263 10,244 77.24 2,905 21.90 114 0.86
Jun 11,451 8,985 78.46 2,192 19.14 274 2.39
Jul 12,338 9,721 78.79 2,497 20.24 120 0.97
Aug 15,677 12,379 78.96 2,910 18.56 388 2.48
Sep 17,408 13,208 75.87 2,906 16.69 1,294 7.43
Oct 14,056 8,430 59.97 3,336 23.73 2,290 16.29
Nov 16,288 7,692 47.40 4,326 26.66 4,210 25.94
Dec 15,524 7,358 47.40 4,750 30.60 3,416 22.00
Total 165,605 113,120 68.31 39,444 23.82 13,041 7.87
All in all, within the three years and eight months that the Japanese Army was based in Thailand, the 
southern railway was the most important route used for transporting troops and supplies from Padang 
Besar to Alor Star and from Sungei Kolok station to Kota Bharu in Malaya.6 This route became avail-
able after the Japanese successfully occupied Malaya and Singapore on January 1 and February 15, 
1942 respectively. 
1.2?The Construction of New Railways
The construction of new railway tracks was another aspect of the Japanese Army?s strategy for 
southern Thai railways. The Japanese built two new railways as the extension of the existing southern 
lines. One was the Thai?Burma Railway (the Death Railway) extending from Nong Pladuk station in 
Ratchaburi through Kanchanaburi to Thanbyuzayat in Burma. Another was the Chumphon?Kraburi 
Railway (or the Kra Canal Railway) extending from Chumphon station to Kraburi station in Ranong. 
The latter was further connected via a sea route to Victoria Point in Burma. The Japanese Army 
planned to use the Thai?Burma Railway and the Kra Canal Railway to send reinforcements to Burma 
to prepare for an invasion of India.
The Japanese secretly began negotiations for the construction of the new railways in 1942. Lieu-
tenant?Colonel Iwayashi, Director of Transportation of the Japanese Army, was dispatched from To-
 5 Tabulated from information in NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1.6/14 Tarang kanchai rotfai khong kongthap yipun pi 2486 [Table of 
Japanese Army train usage in 2486] (2 January 2486 [1943] to 12 January 2487 [1944]).
 6 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1/5 Khosanoe kandoen rot khabuan thahan Yipun.
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kyo. He presented a ?Draft Thailand?Japan Agreement on the Construction of the Thai?Burma Rail-
way? on March 23, 1942. Japan urged Thailand to consider and approve the agreement as soon as 
possible, claiming that they had an urgent need and that they had already trained skilled Thai techni-
cians for this construction work.7 The Thai government was not given suﬃcient time to consider very 
carefully. On September 16, 1942, the agreement was signed by Field Marshal Phibun, Prime Minister 
and Supreme Commander, and General Moriya Seji, representative of the Japanese Army in Thailand. 
Shortly after the construction work of the Thai?Burma Railway began, the Japanese Army headquar-
ters in Tokyo sent General Yamada, a military envoy, to Thailand. On May 13, 1943, he secretly pre-
sented another draft agreement on the Kra Canal Railway or Chumphon?Kraburi Railway. The 
Japanese claimed that they were facing diﬃculty in sending troops and armaments to Burma by sea 
and air due to the heavy attacks by the British. Therefore, it was necessary to construct the Chumphon?
Kraburi Railway.8 Again; the Thai government had to respond immediately. According to Thai sources, 
the government was afraid of possible military retaliation if it refused. The Thai government 
responded very quickly, only three weeks after the first contact with General Yamada. On May 31, 
1943, Phibun as Supreme Commander signed the agreement with Lieutenant-General Aketo Nakamura, 
Commander of the Japanese Army in Thailand. The two agreements required Thailand to assume 
various burdens. For example, Thailand must allow the Japanese Army to use land for the railways for 
free of charge; to cooperate in recruiting mechanics and laborers and provide equipment for the 
construction works; and to solve any problems that arose during construction.9
The Japanese Army wanted to complete the 359-kilometer Thai?Burma Railway within one year. For 
this purpose, the army used many POWs and also recruited Chinese and Indian laborers from Singa-
pore and Malaya. They were transported by the southern railways across the Thai border to Ban Pong 
and detained at Don Tum Temple Camp in Ratchaburi. Then they had to walk or ride on trucks to 
Kanchanaburi. According to the secret documents, in September 1943 in the area of Kanchanaburi 
alone there were 130,144 men recruited to construct the Thai?Burma Railway: 24,764 Japanese sol-
diers, 41,570 POWs, 40,900 Indian laborers and 22,190 Chinese laborers.10 Even so, manpower was in-
suﬃcient to serve the urgent plan of using the route to send supplies to the troops advancing into the 
Burma?India border area and being counterattacked by the British. The Japanese Army forced the 
POWs to work hard day and night for thirteen months until the construction was finished on October 
17, 1943. The POWs and laborers did not have enough food and suﬀered from disease and natural di-
 7 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1.2/2 Khotoklong lae khoplikyoi rawang Thai kap Yipun kiaokap kansang thangrotfai chueam rawang 
Thai kap Phama [Agreement and sub-agreement between Thailand and Japan on constructing a railway connecting Thailand 
and Burma] (23 March 2485 [1942]?23 January 2486 [1943]).
 8 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1.3/4 Banthuek kanprachum rueang khotoklong kiaokap kansang thangrotfai thahan kham phuenthi 
khokhot Kra (Chumphon?Kraburi) [Minutes of the meetings on agreement on constructing a military railway across the Kra 
Isthmus (Chumphon?Kraburi)] (12 May 2486 [1943]?23 April 2487 [1944]).
 9 Ibid.
10 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.5.2/4 Kankhlueanwai khong thahan Yipun nai changwat Ratchaburi?Kanchanaburi [Movements of Jap-
anese soldiers in Ratchaburi and Kanchanaburi provinces] (28 February 2485 [1942]?30 June 2488 [1945]).
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sasters. It is recorded that 12,339 POWs died during the construction of the Thai?Burma line, thus it 
was given the name of ?the Death Railway.?
For the case of the Chumphon?Kraburi line, the Japanese Army had to construct the La-un canal 
pier as well. This was because the railway would not be connected directly with Burma. The railway 
would only run from Chumphon to Khao Fachi in Kraburi, the closest point of contact with Victoria 
Point in Burma. It was necessary to build a pier to ship soldiers, food and armaments across the sea.11 
For the constructing of this route, the Japanese Army did not use POWs but hired Chinese and Malay 
laborers whom Japanese companies recruited in Singapore. These workers traveled by train and truck 
and finally walked to the site.12 The secret documents of the Committee in Chumphon and Ranongon 
recorded the number of laborers. For example, from 15 August to the end of September 1943, a thou-
sand laborers were sent from Singapore to Chumphon by train every day. In total, 30,000 men were 
sent during that period.13 
In addition, the Japanese Army hired local Thai workers in Chumphon and Ranong. Many local 
people were willing to work for the construction, because of the high payment, 1.20?1.50 baht per 
day.14 However, as manpower was still in short supply, the Japanese Army had to ask Thai oﬃcers to 
find more workers, oﬀering even higher payment of 2.50?3.00 baht per day. Consequently, workers 
from other provinces such as Trang, Surat Thani, Phatthalung, Songkhla, Phetchaburi, Nakhon Path-
om, Pathum Thani, Ayutthaya, and Nakhon Nayok flocked to Chumphon and Ranong until the rail-
way construction was finished on December 25, 1943.15
2.?The Impact on the Japanese Army and the Thai Railway Department 
The Japanese Army invaded Thailand on December 8, 1941. Three days later, on December 11, the 
army presented a draft agreement for the military utilization of Thai railways. It was on December 21 
that the Thai government signed the document. However, the primary documents in the National Ar-
chives show that the Japanese Army had already started using the northern, eastern and southern rail-
ways as early as December 9, in other words, even before the Thai oﬃcial agreement.16
2.1?The Military Transportation of the Japanese Army
The Japanese Army control of the southern Thai railways had various eﬀects on Japanese military 
11 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1/7 Naeosenthang lae phaenphang sathani Chumphon thangyaek thangrot fai tat thangluang [Route 
and diagram of Chumphon station junction of railway and highway] (31 May 2486 [1943]?19 January 2488 [1945]).
12 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.5.2/10 Kankhlueanwai khong thahan Yipun nai changwat chumphon [Movements of Japanese soldiers 
in Chumphon province] (2 March 2486 [1943]?25 November 2487 [1944]).
13 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1.3/6 Uppakon kankosang thangrotfai thahan sai Chumphon?Kraburi [Equipment used in the con-
struction of the Chumphon?Kraburi military railroad line] (22 May 2486 [1943]?14 December 2487 [1944]).
14 Interviews with Mr. Lap Rueangkamnoet, age 80, Chumphon (5 October 2003) and Mr. Supat Siriphan, age 83, Ranong (6 Oc-
tober 2003).
15 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1.3/8 Kammakon lae chang [Laborers and technicians] (12 June 2486 [1943]?18 October 2487 
[1944]).
16 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1.6/3 Tarang kanchai rotfai khong kongthap Yipun pi 2485 [Table of Japanese Army train usage in 
2485] (2 December 2484 [1941]?2 December 2485 [1942]).
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operations. The Army could fully utilize the southern Thai railways to transport soldiers and provi-
sions to its troops in Burma and Malaya. It could also transport POWs and Indian and Chinese work-
ers from Singapore and Malaya to construct new railways, and then use the newly-built railways to 
transport troops and armaments to Burma. For example, when the Japanese took control over the 
southern railways, they could transport foods using Thai trains from Padang Besar to Alor Star and 
from Sungei Golok to Kota Bharu, and then use Malay trains to go further into the south.17 More spe-
cifically, the Japanese Army carried rice to its troops in Malaya through the routes from Thonburi sta-
tion (Bangkok Noi) to Padang Besar, and Bangsue to Padang Besar almost on a daily basis; 24?25 cov-
ered goods wagons were used per day.18 The documents of the Supreme Command Headquarters 
reported the amount of rice transported every month in detail, thus confirming the success of the Jap-
anese Army in controlling and using the southern Thai railways for its military purposes. This fact also 
reflected Thailand?s location at the center of the Japanese Army?s food supplies in continental South-
east Asia during the war.
Another secret document recorded in detail the number of soldiers and armaments being transport-
ed on the Thai?Burma Railway. This is another illustration of the Japanese success in using the south-
ern Thai railways. Table 3 shows how successfully the Japanese Army utilized the Thai?Burma Rail-
ways in transporting armaments to its troops in Burma. Within a period of only four months from July 
1 to October 31, 1944, the Army was able to use 396 covered goods wagons to transport 120 pieces of 
artillery, along with bullets and shells. They also transported twenty Autonomous Armored Vehicles 
(AAV), twelve ammunition carriers, and four armoured tanks. Moreover, there were seventy-eight 
closed wagons whose contents are not specified.
Table 3.? Armaments of the Japanese Army Transported by the Thai?Burma Railway during July 1?October 31, 
194419
Date Number of carriages/type of carriage Transported armaments
July 1, 1944
July 3, 1944
July 5, 1944
July 6, 1944
July 7, 1944
July 8, 1944
22 Malaya Covered Goods Vans 
2 Malaya Flat Wagons
5 Malaya Flat Wagons
5 Malaya Flat Wagons
3 Malaya Flat Wagons
3 Malaya Flat Wagons
13 Malaya Covered Goods Vans 
5 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
4 Malaya Flat Wagons
3 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
Commodities (Closed wagon)
2 pieces of artillery
Artillery Shells
10 pieces of artillery
6 pieces of artillery
6 pieces of artillery
Commodities (Closed wagon)
Commodities (Closed wagon)
4 Autonomous Armoured Vehicle (AAV)
Commodities (Closed wagon)
17 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1/5 Khosanoe kandoen rot khabuan thahan Yipun.
18 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1.6/15 Kanbanthuk yutthopakon thahan Yipun [Transport of armaments for the Japanese Army] (10 
February 2486 [1943]?9 November 2487 [1944]).
19 Tabulated from information in ibid.
?     ?
Puengthip Kiattisahakul
264
Date Number of carriages/type of carriage Transported armaments
July 9, 1944
July 10, 1944
July 12, 1944
July 15, 1944
July 18, 1944
July 20, 1944
July 24, 1944
July 26, 1944
July 30, 1944
August 13, 1944
August 15, 1944
August 16, 1944
August 17, 1944
August 21 1944
September 11, 1944
September 13, 1944
September 20, 1944
September 25, 1944
September 26, 1944
September 27, 1944
September 29, 1944
September 30, 1944
October 3, 1944
October 5, 1944
October 8, 1944
October 9, 1944
October 11, 1944
October 12, 1944
October 13, 1944
October 16, 1944
October 17, 1944
October 20, 1944
October 21, 1944
October 23, 1944
October 24, 1944
October 25, 1944
October 26, 1944
October 27, 1944
7 Malaya Flat Wagons
7 Malaya Flat Wagons
1 Malaya Flat Wagons
14 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
8 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
4 Malaya Flat Wagons
4 Malaya Flat Wagons
1 Malaya Flat Wagons
4 Malaya Flat Wagons
15 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
4 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
8 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
3 Malaya Flat Wagons
1 Malaya Flat Wagon
3 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
4 Malaya Flat Wagons
2 Malaya Flat Wagons
2 Malaya Flat Wagons
8 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
5 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
3 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
3 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
10 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
11 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
11 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
14 Japanese Covered Goods Vans
9 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
8 Malaya Flat Wagons
10 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
8 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
5 Malaya Flat Wagons
7 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
13 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
6 Malaya Flat Wagons
4 Thai Covered Goods Vans
17 Malaya Flat Wagons
3 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
15 Malaya Flat Wagons
1 Malaya Flat Wagon
35 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
15 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
25 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
2 Malaya Flat Wagons
8 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
20 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
42 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
6 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
8 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
15 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
12 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
7 AAV
14 pieces of artillery
1 Artillery
Commodities (Closed wagon)
Bullets
4 Armoured Cars
4 AAV
1 piece of artillery
1 Trench Gun
4 pieces of artillery
Commodities (Closed wagon)
Bullets
Commodities (Closed wagon)
6 pieces of field artillery
4 pieces of field artillery
Commodities (Closed wagon)
4 pieces of artillery
4 pieces of Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
2 AAV
Bullets
Bullets
3 pieces of artillery
Bullets
Bullets
Bullets
Bullets
Bullets
Bullets
8 pieces of artillery
Bullets
Bullets
5 pieces of artillery
Bullets
Bullets
6 pieces of artillery
Bullets
17 pieces of field artillery
3 AAV
15 pieces of artillery
1 pieces of artillery
Bullets and Commodities
Bullets
Bullets and Commodities
2 pieces of artillery
Bullets
Bullets and Commodities
Bullets
Bullets
Bullets
Bullets and Commodities
Bullets
Table 3.?Continued.
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Date Number of carriages/type of carriage Transported armaments
October 28, 1944
October 29, 1944
October 30, 1944
October 31, 1944
10 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
8 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
22 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
15 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
25 Malaya Covered Goods Vans
Bullets and Commodities
Artilleries Shells
Bullets and 450 Japanese Soldiers
Bullets and 50 Japanese Soldiers
Bullets, Commodities and 250 Japanese Soldiers
The documents in the Thai National Archives report that the Japanese regarded the Thai?Burma 
Railway as vital for the transportation of troops and weapons. Towards the end of the war, the Allies 
sent aircraft to bomb several railway lines used by the Japanese Army, particularly important railway 
bridges such as the bridge over the Kwai Noi River in Kanchanaburi. This bridge was heavily raided on 
January 11, 1945, when twenty Allied planes dropped about 130 bombs. On February 25, 1945, two 
planes dropped about sixteen bombs destroying the piers. The Japanese Army had to temporarily close 
the Kanchanaburi?Tanbyuzayat line.20
2.2?The Burdens of the Thai Railway Department
The control of the Japanese Army over the southern Thai railways directly and adversely aﬀected the 
Thai Railway Department. According to the agreement between Thailand and Japan, the Department 
had to help the Japanese military in various ways. For example, they had to prepare special train 
schedules for the Japanese. They had also to oﬀer special prices, far cheaper than the normal charges. 
The Department had thus to bear huge losses in fares and freight charges. Even so, the Japanese did 
not pay in cash, but simply accumulated a long-term debt.
Table 4 shows the total unpaid bills of the Japanese Army for fares and freight charges in June 1942. 
The biggest unpaid amount in June 1942 was for bills 236/85 and 232/85. According to the contents of 
the bills, the biggest portion of the costs came from the transportation between Bangkok station (Hua 
Lamphong) to Padang Besar, Bangkok to Hat Yai, Thonburi (Bangkok Noi) to Hat Yai, and Hat Yai to 
Padang Besar, all of them belonging to the southern routes.
Although the Japanese Army paid with checkes drawn on the Yokohama Specie Bank in some 
months, the total amount of the accumulated debts reached as much as 8,262,011.97 baht by January 
1945. 
The bilateral agreement stipulated that the Japanese should liquidate their debts to the Department 
within three months or every three months. The exchange rate applied for this payment was of the 
same level with that of the Thai army, much less favorable than the normal rate. Even when the Japa-
nese Army paid, the Department almost always found discrepancies between the amounts of invoice 
and real payment, but the Department had to tolerate them. Of course, the Japanese Army more fre-
quently failed to pay on time. The Thailand?Japan Alliance Co-operation Department once requested 
20 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.3/7 Banthuek kanprachum Khana Kammakan Pongkan Phai (Rotfai) Thang Akat [Minutes of meet-
ings of the Air Security (Railway) Committee] (23 October 2487 [1944]?22 August 2488 [1945]).
Table 3.?Continued.
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Table 4.?Unpaid Bills of the Japanese Army for Fares and Freight Charges for June 194221
Bill number Unpaid amount (Baht)
232/85
233/85
234/85
235/85
236/85
237/85
238/85
239/85
240/85
94588.20
635.50
99.80
2702.80
458285.50
188.80
433.60
1007.80
27.80
241/85
242/85
243/85
244/85
245/85
246/85
247/85
248/85
249/85
250/85
251/85
252/85
253/85
254/85
255/85
256/85
257/85
258/85
472.60
4.60
89.30
50.40
37.20
9.90
757.50
257.00
8.80
1.50
103.00
134.00
5.20
1238.30
1789.10
951.30
1524.60
775.10
Total unpaid amount, June 1942 556,177.70
the Japanese Army to liquidate the debt, but the Japanese oﬃcer in charge, Division Deputy Ishida, 
simply replied, ?No money, please wait.?22
Another example was the case of the construction projects for new railways. In order to cooperate 
with the Japanese for the new railway construction, the Department had to recruit laborers and allo-
cate special funds to purchase equipment. This kind of obligation brought heavy financial burdens on 
the Department. According to the Agreement and the Sub-Agreement between Thailand and Japan for 
these construction projects, the Thai government, through the Transport Ministry and the Thai Rail-
way Department, had to provide loans of 32 million baht for the Thai-Burma Railway and 15 million 
baht for the Kra Canal Railway.23
In addition, the Department had to prepare its own budget to purchase the necessary equipment for 
the construction of the two railways, including stations. Although the bilateral agreement stipulated 
21 Tabulated from information in NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut. 2.4.17/15 Song bin kongthap yipun khang chamra duen Mithunayon 2485 
[Unpaid bills of the Japanese Army, June 1942] (12 January 2485 [1942]) and 2.4.1.7/9 (Puek 1-3) Raikan ngoen khakhonsong 
lamliang kongthap Yipun lae kanchamra ni [List of transportation costs of the Japanese Army and debt payments] (23 Febru-
ary 2485 [1942]?11 April 2489 [1946]).
22 NA Bo. Ko. Sungsut 2.4.1.1/1 Kanprachum Khana Kammakan Borihan Krom Rotfai [Meetings of Railway Administration 
Committee] (5 October 2484 [1941]?13 September 2486 [1943]).
23 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1.2/8 Ngoppraman kanngoen nai kansang thangrotfai sai Kanchanaburi [Budget for construction of 
the Kanchanaburi railway line] (16 September 2485 [1942]?23 August 2488 [1945]).
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that the Japanese Army should pay in advance to the Department to buy equipment, in reality they 
only spent 500,000 baht for the Thai?Burma Railway and 200,000 baht for the Kra Canal Railway (This 
money was actually taken from the first installment of the loan promised by Thailand for the construc-
tion of railways, the total amount of which was 4,000,000 baht). Moreover, the Japanese did not trans-
fer this entire amount to the Department, but reserved a part of it for their own purchasing.24 At any 
rate, the amount which the Department had received from the Japanese was not suﬃcient to purchase 
the equipment. The Thai Railway Department frequently requested the Thailand?Japan Alliance 
Co-operation Department to urge the Japanese Army to liquidate the debt, but the army only paid 
back in installments.25 Therefore, when the war was over, a huge amount of this debt remained unpaid. 
Conclusion
During World War II, for the case of Thailand, which was the only independent country in the re-
gion, the Japanese Army utilized its territory as a base from which Japanese military reinforcements, 
food supplies, weapons and war equipment could be transported to Burma and Malaya. To accomplish 
this task, the Japanese Army negotiated with Thailand for co-operation, and placed the Thai railways, 
especially the southern railways under its control. This control, however, could be exerted only at the 
expense of Thailand?s independence and sovereignty. The paper has shown the so-called co-operation, 
which Thailand had other choice but to accept, placed heavy burdens on the Thai government, the 
Thai Railway Department, and the local people.
24 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungust, 2.4.1.2/2 Khotoklong lae khoplikyoi rawang Thai kap Yipun.
25 NA. Bo. Ko. Sungsut, 2.4.1.3/18 Ngoppraman lae nisin thi Yipun tong chai hai thai nai kansang thangrotfai chueam rawang Thai 
kap Phama [Budget and Japanese debts to Thailand for the construction of the Chumphon?Kraburi Railway] (23 March 2485 
[1942]?23 January 2486 [1943]).
